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Rescue those who are being taken away to death; hold back
those who are stumbling to the slaughter.'
(The Bible)
[P]ersonal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity,




More than twenty years after the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Roe v. Wade,3 the heated debate over abortion continues
to make frequent appearances in the media, elections, and courtrooms
of this country. The murders of a doctor and his escort at an abortion
clinic in Florida4 illustrated the fact that for some, the protest over the
legalization of abortion has turned a corner into the realm of extreme
violence.5 The abortion issue now seems to center on just how much
violence this country is willing to condone.
- Lead Article Editor, Seattle University School of Law. B.A. 1976, Douglass College
(Rutgers University); J.D. 1995, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Proverbs 24:11 (the verse upon which pro-life group Operation Rescue bases its call to
action on the abortion issue).
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1972) (holding that the right to privacy includes the
right to choose an abortion).
4. William Claiborne, Two Killed at Clinic in Florida; Radical Abortion Foe Charged in
Shootings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at Al.
5. Federal investigators recently discovered a guide entitled "The Army of God Manual,"
which describes how to construct homemade bombs and advocates the killing of abortion doctors.
Vivienne Walt, Antiabortion Terror Book; Army of God Offers Bomb Plans, NEWSDAY, Sept. 30,
1994, at A6. Paul Hill, the former minister who killed a doctor and his escort in Florida, told a
television interviewer, "There's no question that what I did was a relatively new concept.
Someday it will be commonplace and generally accepted as normal." Christopher B. Daly,
Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion Clinics; Suspect in Boston-Area Shooting Escapes,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994 at Al.
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The fuel firing each side of the debate consists of deeply held
beliefs, not only about the status of a fetus, but also about women and
their role in our culture.6 A proper examination of the legal issues
involved in the abortion controversy must not be based on the morality
of the debate.7  And yet the personal beliefs underpinning the
arguments should not be completely disregarded lest it become too easy
for either side to dismiss those who disagree as either ignorant or
simply unwilling to see the truth.' The beliefs are real; the debate
should continue; the violence must end.
The terms pro-life and pro-choice, chosen by opposing sides of the
abortion issue to represent their causes, are politically charged labels.9
Indeed, how one chooses to use the language surrounding the debate
can often be a statement in itself. Pro-life advocates are commonly
referred to as antiabortionists, while pro-choice groups are termed pro-
abortion or pro-death. The terms antiabortion and pro-choice are terms
used and accepted in the fields of social science'0 and the law, and
therefore will be used in this Comment." Also, because this Com-
ment centers on acts of violence directed toward abortion clinics, the
term antiabortion, as opposed to pro-life, serves to differentiate the
extremist views of those involved in violence against reproductive
clinics from the views of those involved in peaceful demonstrations for
political change.
An effective remedy for the violence directed against abortion
clinics, health care providers, and the women attempting to secure
services has yet to be implemented. Such a remedy is necessary not
only to punish those responsible for unlawful acts, but is also necessary
for the culture as a whole. A woman should be able to secure her right
to an abortion, and a doctor should be able to provide abortion
services, without having to run a gauntlet of terror. Likewise, peaceful
protesters should be able to retain their First Amendment rights
6. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
Luker's book is a sociological study of the abortion issue, examining the history of the debate, the
issues involved, and the people choosing to align themselves with each side. Luker argues that
the debate draws on deep feelings about such things as children, families, sex, religion, and the
basic nature of the individual.
7. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465, 468-69
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (upholding the grant of a motion in limine to preclude evidence of moral beliefs
on the issue of abortion as a justification or motive to be used as a defense to alleged illegal acts).
8. LUKER, supra note 6, at 3.
9. DALLAS A. BLANCHARD & TERRY J. PREWITI', RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND
ABORTION, THE GIDEON PROJECT 12 (1993).
10. Id., at 13.
11. Judicial opinions in cases involving violence against abortion clinics, in which pro-life
groups have frequently been parties, have used the term antiabortionists.
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without having to fear unwarranted sanction. 2 The escalation of
violence at abortion clinics, combined with the frustration surrounding
the lack of a remedy has further polarized the two sides of the abortion
debate.
The Supreme Court's decision in National Organization for
Women, Inc. (NOW) v. Scheidlert3 and Congress' enactment of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)14 should both be
applauded for bringing the possibility of a remedy for the violence one
step closer to realization. The Supreme Court, by ruling that an
economic motivation is not necessary for purposes of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),"5 kept alive the
possibility of this statute's applicability to antiabortionist violence.
Congress, by enacting FACE, provided both private parties and
prosecutors with a potential legal remedy for the clinic violence and
certain types of illegal obstruction. Both RICO and FACE are
necessary in this setting and should be vigorously utilized. Civil
RICO is an ideal tool for use against both the leaders of the extremist
antiabortion movement who seek to incite others to violence and the
violent antiabortion groups themselves. FACE is now available as
both a civil remedy and a prosecutorial weapon against those who
choose to cross the line from peaceful protest into violence or certain
forms of nonviolent obstruction. Nonviolent political protest protected
by the First Amendment and the systematic encouragement or
commitment of illegal activity are not the same thing.
In Section I, this Comment examines the nature of the violence
erupting out of protest activity at abortion clinics. Section II outlines
the treatment of different types of federal lawsuits brought by clinics
and pro-choice groups against both antiabortion groups and the leaders
that spearhead the violent protest campaigns. Section III explores the
use of RICO against such groups and individuals, and the imposition
of an economic motivation requirement. Section IV discusses both the
Seventh Circuit's and the Supreme Court's decisions in NOW v.
Scheidler.16  Section V addresses the concerns surrounding the
12. The only doctor in Mississippi who performs abortions dons an Army combat helmet
and bulletproof vest to go to work. Meanwhile, the National Right to Life Committee has
prohibited its staff and board members from picketing clinics for fear that such activity could be
illegal. Laurie Goodstein, Life and Death Choices; Antiabortion Faction Tries to Justify Homicide,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1994, at Al.
13. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
14. 18 U.S.C.S. § 248 (Supp. 1994).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1988).
16. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
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application of RICO to political protest activities. Section VI looks at
Congress' intervention with legislation aimed to protect reproductive
health care providers and their patients from violence, blockades,
threats, and destruction of property, while ensuring the right to speech
and conduct protected by the First Amendment. And Section VII
briefly describes the possibilities for application of the two statutes.
I. VIOLENCE AGAINST ABORTION CLINICS17
We regretted the passing of [Dr. Britton's] life just like a Jew
in 1943 Poland who just heard Dr. Josef Mengele and his
bodyguard were shot down in Auschwitz that morning."8
(President of Rescue America)
A bullet will stop me, and psychological violence will stop me
.... You got one doctor down. All they need to do is kill a
couple more, and then everybody quits.19
(Physician)
Antiabortionists believe that abortion is murder. They believe
that a higher law calls them to stop it.2" As in the pro-choice
movement, language is very powerful here; fetuses are babies, clinics
are abortuaries, birth control is an abortifacient, and physicians are
child-slaughterers. 21 Antiabortionists hold deep beliefs about their
actions and compare their movement to those of Ghandi and Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.22 However, the violence of the actions
17. Abortion services are provided in hospitals, physician's offices, and various types of
clinics. Approximately two-thirds of the procedures are performed in specialized abortion clinics.
Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 23 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 246, 246 (Nov/Dec 1991). The violence surrounding the abortion debate has not been
limited to abortion clinics, but has also included organizations, such as Planned Parenthood, that
offer abortion referrals and counseling but do not necessarily perform abortions on site.
NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, SUMMARY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ABORTION
PROVIDERS (Oct. 14, 1993). Furthermore, almost all abortion facilities provide other medical
services; 94% provide contraceptive care to non-abortion patients, while 74% provide general
gynecological care and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. Henshaw, supra, at 247. It
follows that much of the violence and harassment spills over into non-abortion-related patients
and clinic personnel. For purposes of this article, the hospitals, physicians' offices, and clinics
experiencing acts of violence and harassment will be referred to as abortion "clinics."
18. David Van Biema, Apologists for Murder, TIME, Aug. 15, 1994, at 39 (statement of Don
Trashman, President of Rescue America).
19. AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, ABORTION REPORT (May 7, 1993) (statement of
physician who performs abortions). Ironically, this statement was made before "they" did kill "a
couple more".
20. See generally, LUKER, supra note 6.
21. John Balzar, Abortion Foes Test the Limits, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al.
22. 139 CONG. REC. E2944 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Hon. Packard).
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committed by some of these groups hardly paints a picture of peaceful
civil disobedience.
The number of violent incidents at abortion clinics is staggering.
More than one thousand acts of violence were committed against
abortion clinics from 1977 to April, 1993.23 In addition, over six
thousand clinic blockades and disruptions have been reported since
1977.24 Seventy-three percent of abortion clinics have been the target
of at least one illegal activity.2
Even more staggering, however, is the growing sense of disregard
for the law and the conviction that the existence of abortion justifies
any action to stop it. 6 Since the highly-publicized murders of Dr.
John Bayard Britton and his escort in Pensacola, Florida,27 Dr. David
Gunn, also in Pensacola,2" the killings of two Planned Parenthood
staff workers and the woundings of others present, 29 and the wound-
ing of Dr. George Tiller in Wichita, Kansas,30 many antiabortion
groups have publicly condemned the shootings.3 Other groups,
23. S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1993) (citing NATIONAL ABORTION
FEDERATION, INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE & DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS (Apr.
16, 1993)) (summary submitted to the committee with the testimony of Willa Craig). The acts
within that time frame include one murder, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, 81 arsons, at least 36
bombings, 2 kidnappings, and 327 clinic invasions. Id.
24. Id.
25. Jacqueline D. Forrest & Stanley K. Henshaw, The Harassment of U.S. Abortion Providers,
19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 9, 9 (Jan./Feb. 1987).
26. An Operation Rescue coordinator testified before a House Committee that he believed
it would be appropriate to kill someone involved in abortion services. S. REP. NO. 117, supra
note 23, at 4 (citing a Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, May 6, 1992, at 170). Such beliefs are also widely reported
in the newspapers. See, e.g., Goodstein, supra note 12, at Al (reporting that thirty-two
antiabortion leaders have signed a petition declaring an abortion doctor's murder a justifiable
homicide).
27. Claiborne, supra note 4, at Al.
28. Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors' Home Lives; Illegal Intimidation or
Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, April 8, 1993, at Al. The irony in the commission of this
murder is that Griffin, the man accused of the shooting, did not deny the act; rather, he
attempted to use insanity as a defense, claiming that antiabortion propaganda drove him mad.
William Booth, Antiabortion Propaganda is Cited in Florida Murder Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,
1994, at A3.
29. Sylvia Adcock, This is a War; ? Abortion Clinics Intent on Improving Security, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 31, 1994 at AS.
30. Don Phillips, Violence Hardly Ruffled Protest Ritual; Foes, Supporters of Abortion Rights
Resume Routine at Kansas Clinic, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at A8.
31. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops strongly condemned the killing of Dr.
David Gunn. Booth, supra note 28, at Al. Also, several mainstream antiabortion groups,
including Operation Rescue, through its new director, Flip Benham, have publicly announced
their opposition to the more recent killings. David Van Biema, Avenging the Unborn, TIME, Aug.
8, 1994, at 26.
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however, have condoned or even applauded the events.32 While it
may be argued that these shootings were isolated incidents among both
legal and illegal protest activities, the death threats, wanted posters,33
and picketing of physicians' homes are generating fear among those
who perform abortions.34 Lately, antiabortion groups have advocated
a widespread targeting of physicians in the campaign against abortion,
including a recent attempt to encourage attorneys to bring malpractice
suits against physicians who perform abortions.3" More terrifying,
however, is the radical groups' commitment to the justified slaying of
these physicians under the theory that they are "serial child killers.
36
In the quest to stop abortions, some extremely powerful antiabor-
tion groups systematically encourage their supporters to perform illegal
acts. 37 For example, the term rescue has become a household word in
the United States, and is practically synonymous with its founding
organization, Operation Rescue. While a rescue has been defined by
antiabortion groups as simply a physical placing of oneself between the
pregnant woman and the abortion,38 rescues frequently entail the
32. Andrew Burnett, the publisher of Life Advocate, an antiabortion magazine with a
monthly circulation of 3,700, is quoted as writing about the death of Gunn:
Was his life really more valuable than the lives of his thousands of victims? When you
examine your own convictions, I pray that God will encourage you to take an even
stronger stand and be willing to do even more to protect the lives of those we say are
precious in God's sight.
Balzar, supra note 21, at Al. Joseph M. Scheidler, one of the founders of the militant antiabortion
movement and head of the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), stated "What's happening is that
those who live by the sword now face dying by the sword. Violence begets violence, and abortion
is the ultimate violence." Id. He insists that he does not condone violence; rather, his attitude
is one of no longer condemning the violence committed by others. Id.
33. Antiabortion groups create "Wanted" posters offering rewards for the arrest of a
physician or the revocation of a physician's medical license, and circulate these posters throughout
an area. Boodman, supra note 28, at Al. Posters of another Florida physician, Dr. Frank Snydle,
featured addresses and phone numbers of family members, along with the automobile license plate
numbers of his former girlfriends. Id.
34. Id.
35. Life Dynamics, a new Texas antiabortion group, mailed a 72-page guide, along with a
video and television commercial, to 4,000 attorneys across the country in an effort to educate and
equip them for malpractice suits against abortionists. The kit argues that a woman has the right
to sue for emotional damages resulting from an abortion because abortionists do not obtain
informed consent from the women, and these women then experience "post-abortion syndrome."
Life Dynamics has also produced a comic book of abortion doctor jokes, such as: "What would
you do if you found yourself in a room with Hitler, Mussolini and an abortionist, and you had
a gun with only two bullets?-Shoot the abortionist twice." Vivienne Walt, Group Offers Case
in a Kit; New Tactic vs. Abortion Docs, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 1993, at 8.
36. Goodstein, supra note 12, at Al.
37. See generally JOSEPH M. SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION (1985)
(manual advocating unlawful methods of abortion clinic interference).
38. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d
582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, vacated in part, Bray v. Alexandria Women's
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illegal acts of protesters pouring glue into clinic locks,39 locking
themselves to clinic doors,4" damaging medical equipment,4" hitting,
pinching, and kicking clinic personnel,4" trespassing on clinic property
despite warnings from law enforcement personnel,43 and strewing
nails in parking lots and on roadways leading to clinics.44 Other
tactics include mass scheduling of no-show appointments,45 sending
hate mail, making harassing calls, stalking,46 and using chemicals to
destroy equipment or evacuate clinics.47
As would be expected, the violence and harassment greatly affect
abortion clinics.48 Clinics have incurred increased expenditures in
providing additional security personnel, as well as increased legal
expenses. Malpractice, fire, and casualty insurance policies are
routinely canceled. Additionally, many of the clinics have been
informed that they must meet new licensing requirements in order to
operate their facilities.49
The violence and harassment also affects patients. In addition to
the obvious emotional effects,"0 the violence and harassment have an
economic effect on patients as well. Most abortions are performed in
specialized reproductive health clinics. It is these clinics, rather than
traditional hospitals, that are most often targeted by antiabortion
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
39. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
40. Id.
41. West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371. 374 (D. Conn. 1989), vacated,
915 F.2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1990).
42. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 221 (6th Cir. 1991).
43. Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
44. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 23, at 9 (testimony of David R. Lasso).
45. Forrest & Henshaw, supra note 25, at 11.
46. NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE & DISRUPTION
AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS (Oct. 1993) (stalking is defined as the persistent following,
threatening, and harassing of an abortion provider, staff member, or patient away from the clinic).
47. NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, SUMMARY OF EXTREME VIOLENCE AGAINST
ABORTION PROVIDERS AS OF OCT. 14, 1993. Chemicals such as mace or tear gas are sprayed
into clinics. There have also been incidents of butyric acid vandalism. This foul-smelling acid
permeates the environment and can also cause illness. Kurt Chandler, Operation Rescue Boot
Camp, STAR TRIB., Apr. 18, 1993, at 1A.
48. The abortion rate, however, has remained stable. The annual rate fluctuated only
slightly from 1980-1988. Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the
United States, 1987 and 1988, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 102, 104 (May/June, 1990).
49. Forrest & Henshaw, supra note 25, at 12.
50. Now, it doesn't take a brain surgeon to figure out ... that a mob ... sitting on
the sidewalk or chained to a radiator, bugging you, "praying" for you, hurling names
at you, playing tape recordings of crying babies saying "Mommy, please don't kill
me,"... is intimidating, coercive, or threatening .... These are women undergoing
a very personal, paiful event in their lives....
Bella English, Abortion Foes Get Personal, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1993, at 19.
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groups."1  These clinics also provide the least expensive services."
The majority of the violence and harassment forms part of a continu-
ous campaign of pressure. 3 Therefore, patients can purposefully seek
to avoid these targeted clinics. Because abortion services are not
readily available,5 4 and the clinics offering the least expensive services
are targeted by antiabortion groups, violence against these clinics
affects low-income women to a disproportionate degree. 5 It becomes
necessary to either obtain services from a more expensive provider,
travel a long distance to obtain services, 6 or simply forego the
abortion altogether. The additional financial burden is more difficult
for the poor.
II. THE BATTLE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The pro-aborts are completely misusing the justice system .
Judges need to know they should not capitulate. They also
need to know very clearly that we will not be intimidated....
If a judge bows to the pressure... [h]e will look foolish to the
public for issuing an order because rescuers won't obey. 7
(Randall Terry)
There is a tradition of civil disobedience. But with civil
disobedience goes the fact of accepting punishment. Operation
Rescue and all those ... have this weird idea that they can
blockade clinics but that the law ought not to be enforced and
that there should be no punishment for that."
(Rep. Schumer)
51. Forrest & Henshaw, supra note 25, at 10.
52. Henshaw, supra note 17, at 248-49. Abortions performed in hospitals are fifty percent
more expensive than those performed in specialized clinics for the same type of service. Id.
53. Forrest & Henshaw, supra note 25, at 11.
54. See generally, Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 48 (discussing the availability of abortion
services in different types of facilities and their geographic locations); Henshaw, supra note 18
(discussing types of providers and the barriers to the services in terms of distance, cost,
harassment, period of gestation, and HIV status).
55. Brief for Appellant at 10, NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No. 92-780).
56. Id.
57. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 23, at 11 (citing testimony of New York Attorney General
Robert Abrams to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, May 12, 1993; statement
of Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue).
58. 139 CONG. REc. H10063, H10101 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Schumer).
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Beleaguered abortion clinics have brought countless lawsuits into
the federal court system due to frustration with the unwillingness 9 or
inability of local authorities to deal with the problem of violence
directed at abortion clinics. Because the antiabortion groups target
particular clinics, the numbers of protesters engaged in illegal acts often
overwhelm local law enforcement personnel. 60 Additionally, many of
the organizers are from outside the immediate vicinity, thereby making
it difficult to charge or seek injunctions against them.61 Some groups
train their participants to effectively resist arrest 62 and encourage
individuals to disregard court orders.63 Moreover, the fines imposed
on individuals at the state level are so small as to have virtually no
deterrent effect.64
Lawsuits at the federal level have hardly proved less frustrating.
Indeed, although injured parties have turned to the federal courts for
relief denied them at the state level, these parties have been met with
a lack of any adequate remedy at the federal level as well. Faced with
a total lack of prosecutorial initiative, clinics, women's groups, and
individuals have primarily utilized the Sherman Anti-Trust Act65, the
Ku Klux Klan Act,66 and RICO67 in their efforts to obtain relief.
The courts have been absolutely unwilling to uphold claims under the
anti-trust laws, 61 leaving RICO and the Ku Klux Klan Act as
possibilities for recovery.
59. Womens Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D. Kan. 1991)
rev'd and remanded, 24 F.3d 107, vacated, 25 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1994).
60. S. REP. NO. 117, supra note 23, at 20.
61. Id. at 13.
62. SCHEIDLER, supra note 37, at 286-88.
63. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 23, at 11.
64. Id.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[e]very ... conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States... is ... illegal .... ").
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) ("If two or more persons ... conspire... for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws . .
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
68. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the reach of antitrust laws
does not include the protection of industries faced by violent opposition from the public), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 798 (1994); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (dismissing antitrust claim for failure to show evidence of anti-competitive impact on
the provision of abortion services and failure to show evidence of revenue damage), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
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With its decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,69
however, the Supreme Court significantly limited the possibility of
recovery under the Ku Klux Klan Act. The Court held that the first
clause of the Act, the "deprivation" clause, did not provide injunctive
relief for the medical facilities seeking to restrain Operation Rescue
from acts of obstruction and trespass. The Court stated that opposi-
tion to abortion is not discrimination against a class of "women seeking
abortions. '"70 Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the
class-based discrimination was directed at the class of "women in
general." 71  An additional failure of the claim was attributed to the
clinic's failure to identify any right that was guaranteed against private
action; the rights alleged to have been violated were the right to
interstate travel and the right to abortion.72 The second clause of the
Act, the "hindrance" clause, was discussed in dicta, as the parties had
not alleged a claim under this clause in the lower courts.73
Decisions in the lower courts could revive the Act as a potential
source of recovery. One court has upheld a claim under the hindrance
clause.74 Recovery under this clause is far from secure, however, as
courts addressing this issue recently have gone both ways.75
Before the enactment of FACE, RICO was the sole remaining
possibility for federal relief. The relief, however, has not been
satisfactory, and may be won only after running the gauntlet that this
application of RICO entails.
III. THE USE OF RICO AGAINST ANTIABORTIONISTS
[D]o everything we can to torment these people.., to expose
them for the vile, blood-sucking hyenas that they are.76
(Randall Terry)
69. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
70. Id. at 759.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 764.
73. Id. at 764-67.
74. See National Abortion Federation v. Operation Rescue, 8 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding a cause of action under the hindrance clause by analyzing the respective justices' views
in Bray's dictum as to its application in the antiabortion violence context).
75. See id.; Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood v. Doe, 836 F. Supp. 939 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that the practical effect of Bray is to foreclose section 1985(3) as an avenue of relief for
abortion providers; antiabortionists are motivated by their disapproval of abortions, therefore,
neither women seeking abortions nor women in general are a class of persons against whom a
discriminatory animus is directed), afTd, 29 F.3d 620 (2nd Cir. 1994).
76. Boodman, supra note 28, at Al (statement of Randall Terry, founder of Operation
Rescue).
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Let's pray no one gets hurt, but this is a war and we have to
be realistic."
(Shelly Shannon)
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO)" to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States. . . . ",7 The statute's label of racketeer, however, has
been applied to many outside the archetypal gangster, 0 especially
after the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co."
Indeed, the Sedima Court, in ruling that the statute shall be interpreted
broadly, 2 fully recognized that RICO had swollen well beyond its
original conception. 3 Rather than signaling an ambiguity problem,
77. Balzar, supra note 21, at Al (statement of Shelly Shannon, before she shot and wounded
Dr. George Tiller).
78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). The statute encompasses both civil and criminal actions.
Section 1961 sets out definitions of racketeering activity, which constitute the predicate acts for
which a party is prosecuted or sued. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. For purposes of suits against antiabortion
groups, the alleged predicate act is extortion, as defined by the Hobbs Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2) (1988) (defining extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear"); see infra text
accompanying notes 98-103.
Section 1962 makes it unlawful:
(a)... for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ....
(b) ... for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c)... for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d)... for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections
(a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). A pattern of racketeering activity consists of the commission of two
predicate acts within 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
79. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)
(Statement of Findings and Purpose).
80. Civil actions brought under RICO have included novel ideas of what constitutes a
racketeer, especially in the white collar crime area. See, e.g., Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773
F.2d 1175 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986) (investors claim against title
company arising from collapse of land sales agreements); Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819
F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1987) (securities fraud); Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66
(D.N.J. 1986) (sexual harassment and termination of employee because of theft discoveries).
81. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
82. Id. at 497-98.
83. Id. at 500.
Seattle University Law Review
however, the Court stated that this use of the statute against parties
not originally anticipated by Congress demonstrates breadth. 4 If this
breadth is a defect in the statute, the Court reasoned, its remedy lies
with Congress."5 Congress has considered amendments to the statute,
but has not enacted such legislation. 6
Although the use of the civil side of the statute for other than
organized crime purposes has been widely criticized, RICO is often
invoked because it offers plaintiffs seductive possibilities. The
extraordinary civil remedy entices potential litigators with its provisions
for treble damages and attorney's fees. 7 The legislative history of the
statute makes clear, however, that the primary purpose of allowing civil
suits is to promote the public interest through the use of private
attorneys' general suits. 8 In other words, civil RICO suits should be
the type which might be brought by the Department of Justice, but
which, for lack of resources or otherwise, are not.89
Suits brought under civil RICO to combat the violence and
harassment against abortion clinics fit this description. Attorney
General Janet Reno has publicly declared her intolerance for the violent
acts directed against clinics.90 Also, these suits promote the public
interest. Abortion is legal. The rights of those both seeking and
providing such services should be protected. When local law
enforcement has failed, it is necessary to find a federal remedy.
Recovery under civil RICO would compensate beleaguered abortion
providers. Furthermore, such recovery would send a clear signal to the
public that violence and harassment against clinics will not be
tolerated. Nonviolent, peaceful protest simply does not fall under the
statute. RICO would also provide the possibility of a remedy against
the leaders of extremist antiabortion groups-those who incite others
to commit violent acts, but who may not necessarily be present at the
scene.
Many RICO suits have been brought against antiabortion groups,
but problems have arisen in both the application of the statute to these
groups and the reality of the relief available. Both the Sherman Anti-
84. Id. at 499 (citing Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank & Trust, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th
Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
85. Id.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 312, 102d Cong., 1st Seas. (1991).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
88. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 86, at 7.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Kevin Merida, Reno Backs Abortion Protest Limits; Bill Would Make Violent Tactics
Against Clinics a Federal Crime, WASH. POST, May 13, 1993, at A7.
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Trust Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act provide for injunctive relief;9
RICO does not.92 In addition, only one court has awarded RICO's
treble damages to an entity harmed by antiabortion violence,93 and
that award would certainly not be labeled extravagant. The plaintiff
in Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle recovered $2,600 in
damage94 and was also awarded attorney's fees slightly in excess of
$60,00.95
The section of the statute applied in McMonagle, and also most
successfully applied in other RICO suits against antiabortion groups,
is section 1962(c). Under this section, it is unlawful "for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."96  A pattern of
racketeering activity is defined as two or more predicate acts that are
related and pose a threat of continued criminal activity.97 The
predicate act for antiabortion violence suits is Hobbs Act extortion,
which is defined as "the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear.19 8
In granting relief to the women's center, the McMonagle court
ruled on the question that has precluded awards in many of these suits:
whether the enterprise charged with the predicate acts must be
economically motivated.9 9 The defendants argued that Hobbs Act
extortion, the predicate act under RICO, requires an economic
91. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). Although 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) refers
in explicit terms only to a cause of action for damages, a federal court may fashion an appropriate
equitable remedy. See, e.g., NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
92. E.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5837 (W.D.
Wash. May 5, 1989) (dismissing RICO claims for emotional damages and injunctive relief); Town
of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371 (D. Conn. 1989) (finding injunctive
relief unavailable under RICO), vacated, 915 F.2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1990).
93. Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1150, 1163 (E.D. Pa.
1987), affd in part and rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
94. Id. at 1163.
95. Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 1989) (ruling
that the proportionality rule to reduce the award under RICO does not apply), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1068 (1990).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
97. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(bX2) (1988).
99. Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
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motivation.'00 The court, however, concluded that no such economic
motive was necessary.' In so ruling, the court relied on prior
decisions holding that the lack of an economic motivation is not a
defense to Hobbs Act crimes. 10 2 Therefore, the court reasoned, the
lack of an economic motivation is not a defense to a RICO antiabor-
tion violence suit when Hobbs Act crimes serve as the predicate
acts. 10
3
McMonagle further explained that the Hobbs Act protects
intangible property rightsC'° In this case, the rights alleged were the
right to continue to provide services, the right to continue employment,
and the right to enter into contractual relationships with the clinic.
The defendants, while not completely successful in obtaining these
property rights by means of extortion, violated RICO through
attempted extortion, which is also criminalized by the Hobbs Act.10
Although the court's reasoning in McMonagle may seem conclu-
sory, it should be noted that RICO encompasses several different
predicate acts that include extortion in the definitions of racketeering
activity listed in section 1961. Subsection 1(A) lists extortion among
other common law acts or threats. Subsection 1(B) defines racketeering
activity as any act indictable under any of several provisions of Title
18, including the Hobbs Act. 0 6  One of these indictable acts is
Hobbs Act extortion. It would seem, then, that cases interpreting
Hobbs Act extortion should be followed when such is alleged as the
predicate act under RICO; a strict, common law definition of extortion
need not be applied.
While the Third Circuit court in McMonagle did not require an
economic motivation, the Second,0 7  Eighth,108  and Seventh'o'
100. Id. at 1350.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1043 (1980)); United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(B).
104. 868 F.2d at 1350 (quoting Unites States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 267, 281 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986)).
105. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 provides, in pertinent part;
(1) 'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of
the following provisions of title 18, United States Code ... section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion) ....
107. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that the statute does not
reach political activity when such activity is not economically based); United States v. Bagaric, 706
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Circuits all have ruled that an economic motivation is necessary to
impose RICO liability."1 The case from the Seventh Circuit, NOW
v. Scheidler, (Scheidler I)... details the reasoning behind those
decisions.
IV. NOW v. SCHEIDLER AND THE ECONOMIC MOTIVATION
REQUIREMENT
We would take them [the fetuses] home to my house. I had
the garage all cleaned out. And with spotlights and everything,
we would lay them out. A pathologist would judge the age of
the babies and a photographer would take pictures."'
(Joseph Scheidler)
Their criminal acts include murder, arson, bombings, invasions,
stalking school children, chaining locks to clinic doors, stealing
from pathology labs, telephone harassment and other offenses.
Though the named defendants themselves may not have
personally committed all of these crimes, they are the organiz-
ers behind them."3
(Patricia Ireland, President of NOW)
The National Organization for Women (NOW) joined with two
women's health centers in bringing suit on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated women and clinics to recover against the defendant
antiabortion activist groups and their leaders. " 4  The complaint
F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983) (distinguishing Ivic, and ruling that
either the enterprise itself or the predicate acts of racketeering, if economically motivated, fulfill
the requirement); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1032 (1985) (motivation behind predicate acts need only be based in part on economics).
108. United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988)
(attempt to control labor union found to satisfy an economic motivation requirement).
109. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
110. The Sixth Circuit has not yet decided this issue; but, a district court in the Circuit
recently granted a stay in an antiabortion RICO action pending the Supreme Court's ruling on
the issue pursuant to Scheidler. Michigan Abortion Clinic, P.C., v. Kirts, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9985 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 1993). A district court opinion in the Ninth Circuit, while not
expressly addressing the issue, cited McMonagle and dismissed the RICO claim on other grounds.
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5837 (W.D. Wash. May
5, 1989).
111. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
112. Joan Biskupic, Court to Weigh Whether RICO Law Applies to Antiabortion Activists,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1993, at A4 (statement of Joseph Scheidler).
113. Ana Puga, Justices to HearArgument on Suing Abortion Protesters, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
8, 1993, at National/Foreign 25 (statement of Patricia Ireland, President of NOW).
114. Joseph Scheidler and Randall Terry, two of the grandfathers of the antiabortion
movement, were included as defendants. Scheidler is the founder and executive director of the
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alleged that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to close abortion clinics
through a pattern of illegal activity, with many of these activities
organized through a coalition of antiabortion groups known as the Pro-
Life Action Network (PLAN).' NOW specifically alleged that the
defendants have led a nationwide battle against clinics through the
distribution of a manual detailing methods of harassment and
violence." 6 This nationwide battle is illustrated by the fact that the
manual's instructions are followed, resulting in identical methods of
protest, framed in identical language, regardless of the demonstration's
location." 7  Hobbs Act extortion was alleged as the predicate act of
racketeering under RICO, and the claim was brought under sections
1962(a), (c), and (d)."'
A successful claim under section 1962(c) requires proof of (1) the
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity."9 The question of an economic motivation requirement
includes the interpretation of the term enterprise. RICO defines an
enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact though not a legal entity.' 12' The court found the defendants
to be a "group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal
entity" ;121 in other words, the defendants were considered an infor-
mal association.
In addition to dismissing the subsections (a) and (d) claims, the
Scheidler I court also reluctantly'2 2 affirmed the district court's
Pro-Life Action League; Terry is the founder of Operation Rescue and has served as the group's
National Director. Both are extremely active in the antiabortion movement and both have
published works on the subject. SCHEIDLER, supra note 37; RANDALL A. TERRY, OPERATION
RESCUE (1988); RANDALL A. TERRY, TO RESCUE THE CHILDREN (1990).
115. 968 F.2d at 614-15.
116. Id. at 615.
117. See id. The demonstrations are known as "blitzes" and the method is termed "lock and
block." Glue is poured into locks and the protesters chain and lock themselves to the doors of
the clinic. See SCHEIDLER, supra note 37, at 214-16; Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 615.
118. 968 F.2d at 623. The 1962 (d) claim is for conspiracy; its success depends on the party
being found liable under either sections (a), (b), or (c). The 1962(a) claim is a relatively novel
one in RICO suits against antiabortionists. The court in Scheidler dismissed the claim on a theory
of proximate cause and a comparison to RICO criminal forfeiture actions under section 1963.
This reasoning led the court to apply a but for test: Income derived, directly or indirectly is
income the party would not have received but for the racketeering conduct. The court noted that
the plaintiffs had not alleged that defendants would not have received donations but for their acts,
and therefore the income was not derived from racketeering activity. 968 F.2d at 612-25.
119. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
121. 968 F.2d at 626.
122. Id. at 614.
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dismissal of the section 1962(c) claim, stating that RICO requires
either an "economically motivated enterprise or economically motivated
predicate acts."' 123 The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that they
need only show an economic effect on interstate commerce in order to
state a claim under the statute. 12  This argument did not succeed,
but the Scheidler I court did go so far as to find that "it is clear that
the aim of the extortion is to close women's health centers.
125
Through extortion, the antiabortion groups seek to interfere with a
business to such an extent as to close its doors. Although the Scheidler
I court recognized defendant's economic effect on the plaintiff clinics,
it refused to equate that effect with the required economic motiva-
tion. 26
In NOW v. Scheidler (Scheidler 11),127 the United States Supreme
Court was called on to decide the narrow issue of whether RICO
requires such an economic motivation. The Court unanimously ruled
that it does not. 2 '
A. Scheidler I: The Evolution of the Economically Motivated
Enterprise Requirement
The Scheidler I court reasoned that it was bound to follow the
Eighth Circuit's line of analysis involving the economic motivation
requirement because it had previously adopted that circuit's definition
of enterprise in United States v. Anderson."29 In Anderson, the Eighth
Circuit laid out the parameters for determining when an informal
association may be classified as an enterprise. 30 Anderson concerned
two individuals who were charged with defrauding their employers by
utilizing a false purchase-order scheme.'' The court addressed the
question of whether the relationship between these individuals and
those who supplied the false invoices constituted a RICO enterprise.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 626.
125. Id. at 630.
126. Id.
127. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
128. Id. at 800.
129. 968 F.2d at 626; see United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1356, 1372 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 363 (D.C. Cir.)
(adopting the Anderson formula), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); United States v. Errico, 635
F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (also adopting the Anderson formula), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911
(1981).
130. 626 F.2d at 1372.
131. Id. at 1361.
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The stated, narrow issue before the Anderson court was whether the
term enterprise includes an illegitimate association that is proved only
by facts that also establish the predicate acts of racketeering.' 32 The
Anderson court held that an informal association encompasses a
structured association that maintains operations directed toward an
economic goal and that has an existence apart from the commission of
the predicate acts which constitute the pattern of racketeering
activity. 133 Rather than standing for an additional requirement in the
interpretation of when a group of individuals associated in fact is an
enterprise, Anderson could be read as simply requiring a clear
differentiation between the alleged enterprise and the alleged predicate
acts in a RICO action.
Anderson was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Turkette,134 which ruled on an analogous issue
dealing with informal associations. Turkette rejected the First Circuit's
ruling that because each of the specifically enumerated enterprises in
RICO's definition is legitimate, an informal association must also be
legitimate. 3 ' In holding that an enterprise embraces illegitimate
entities, the Court found that the phrase "any union or group
associated in fact" contained no uncertainty as to its meaning, and
therefore the rule of ejusdem generis36 could not be applied.'37
Taking the Turkette Court's reasoning further, one could argue that no
economic motivation requirement should have been applied to an
informal association simply because it may be suggested by the
specifically enumerated items which precede it in the definition of
enterprise.
The Scheidler I court also analyzed and applied cases that
expressly addressed the question of economic motivation under RICO.
The court relied on the Second Circuit's line of reasoning in three cases
involving actions against terrorist groups: United States v. Ivic,
13'
United States v. Bagaric,139 and United States v. Ferguson.4  Ivic
ruled that an economic motivation is necessary under RICO and based
132. Id. at 1365.
133. Id. at 1372.
134. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
135. Id. at 581.
136. This rule is an aid to statutory construction suggesting that where general words follow
specific enumeration, the general words are construed as applying only to persons or things similar
to those specifically enumerated. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990).
137. 452 U.S. at 581.
138. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
139. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
140. 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985).
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its reasoning, in part, on RICO's legislative history. In examining the
legislative history, the Ivic court stated that Congress did not intend
RICO to reach terrorist activities when it sought to eradicate the evil
of organized crime, at least not when such activities were unaccompa-
nied by any financial motive.'41 In light of the rationale of Turkette,
the Ivic court reasoned that RICO could arguably apply to any
organization whose activities generate funds which can serve as a
"springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise.' 1 42 The court
found, however, that political terrorist organizations do not generate
funds that allow them to "springboard into," or infiltrate, legitimate
businesses; the Scheidler I court relied on this finding.' Scheidler
I thus ruled that the activities of political terrorists do not fall within
RICO's reach when the activities do not obtain or yield any money.
Scheidler I also pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in
Northwestern Bell, which refused to uphold a lower court's restriction
of RICO's scope to organized crime.'44 The Northwestern Bell Court
stated that RICO liability extends beyond organized crime because the
statute does not limit the racketeering conduct to that of a group and
does not explicitly state such a limitation. 4 ' But, despite the Su-
preme Court's refusal to embrace a judicially imposed restriction on
the plain language of the statute, Scheidler I determined that Congress
did not intend to reach the activities of political terrorists that involve
neither an economic motivation nor economic crimes. 146
Scheidler I employed Ivic's reasoning, combined with the Eighth
Circuit's definition of enterprise, to conclude that RICO does not
extend to enterprises which are not economically motivated. This
reasoning was flawed; the Supreme Court has consistently rejected
judicial restrictions on the plain language of RICO.47 The require-
ment of an economic motivation is such a judicially imposed restric-
tion. And, indeed, the Court has now rejected the requirement of an
economic motivation. 48
141. 700 F.2d at 62-63.
142. Id. at 63.
143. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
144. Id. at 628 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989)).
145. 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989).
146. 968 F.2d at 628.
147. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No. 92-780)
(citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Reeves v. Ernst &
Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993)).
148. It is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit, since its decision in Scheidler, has
explicitly resisted reading into the statute a qualification that does not appear on its face. In
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B. Scheidler II: The Supreme Court Rules No Economic
Motivation Required
In its unanimous decision holding that RICO does not require an
economically motivated enterprise nor economically motivated
predicate acts, the Court addressed arguments regarding the plain
language of RICO, statutory interpretation, the congressional statement
of findings, prior case law, Department of Justice Guidelines,
legislative history, and lenity-and did so in a relatively brief, cursory
fashion. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist began the opinion in an exasperated
tone,149 signaling the Court's intention to follow its previous rulings
of not encouraging judicial restrictions on the plain language of RICO.
In looking at the plain language of section 1962(c), the Court
pointed out that the words "any enterprise engaged in, or the activities
of which affect interstate ... commerce" come closest to suggesting a
requirement of economic motive. However, the plain meaning of affect
led the Court to conclude that an enterprise can affect-have a
detrimental influence on-interstate commerce without being motivated
by its own profits. 5 '
In interpreting the statute, the Scheidler II Court distinguished
subsections (a) and (b) from subsection (c) by viewing the (a) and (b)
enterprises as the victims of unlawful activity. While these enterprises
may be profit-seeking enterprises, the statute does not require them to
be; it simply requires that the entity be acquired through illegal activity
or illegally generated funds. The enterprise in subsection (c), on the
other hand, is the vehicle through which the illegal acts are committed.
Therefore, because this enterprise is not being acquired, the Court
found that it need not have a property interest that can be acquired,
nor any economic motivation at all."'
The Supreme Court addressed the Scheidler I court's reliance on
Bagaric's reasoning that an economic motivation is necessary partly
because of the congressional statement of findings which prefaces
RICO. The preface refers to activities that "drain billions of dollars
ruling on whether to limit standing to sue under RICO to those who have been injured by reason
of predicate acts committed as part of a RICO violation, the court stated that such a reading
would be "tantamount to rewriting the statute." The court cited Sedima in ruling that RICO
must be interpreted broadly, despite judicial notions of desiring a limit on the reach of the statute.
Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 350 (1992).
149. 114 S. Ct. at 800 ("We are required once again to interpret the provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970... ").
150. Id. at 804.
151. Id.
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from America's economy"; the Scheidler I court determined that such
activities must require an economic motivation. The Supreme Court
rejected this analysis for two reasons. First, the Court stated that
predicate acts, such as the alleged Hobbs Act extortion, could
financially drain the economy by harming businesses such as abortion
clinics. Second, the Court found a congressional statement of findings
a "thin reed" on which to base a requirement of economic motivation
which was neither express nor implied in the substantive portion of the
statute; had Congress wished to include the requirement, it would have
done so.152
Scheidler I relied in part on Department of Justice Guidelines.'
5 3
The Ivic court noted that the 1981 Department of Justice Guidelines
provide that a RICO prosecution should not charge an informal
association as an enterprise unless such association exists "for the
purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal.
• ..,,114 In Scheidler II, the Court rejected this reliance, noting that
the Department of Justice amended its guidelines in 1984. The
amended guidelines dilute whatever force this document had as to the
requirement of economic motivation. As amended, the guidelines state
that an informal association must be "directed toward an economic or
other identifiable goal."' 5
Furthermore, although the Scheidler II Court did not raise the
point, the Department of Justice opposes efforts by Congress to dilute
the strength of sections 1962, 1963 and 1964.156 The added require-
ment of economic motivation dilutes the strength of the statute. Also,
as noted by the Ivic court, these guidelines are simply prosecutorial
guidelines; no defendant could argue their noncompliance in court.' 57
In Scheidler II, the Supreme Court quickly raised and dismissed
the use of legislative history to prove that RICO requires an economic
motivation. The Court found that the statute is unambiguous and that
there is no clear expression in the legislative history that warrants a
different construction. Therefore, the Court ruled that the statute
should be construed according to its plain meaning.'5
8
152. Id. at 805.
153. 968 F.2d at 627.
154. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 64 (2nd Cir. 1983).
155. 114 S. Ct. at 805 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 9-
110.360 (Mar. 9, 1984)).
156. See Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 42
VAND. L. REV. 651, 657 (1990).
157. 700 F.2d at 64.
158. 114 S. Ct. at 806.
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Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the rule of lenity
should be applied.'59 Abruptly stating that the statute is not ambig-
uous and that the rule of lenity should not be applied at the front of
a statutory construction process in order to provide considerations of
leniency, the Court dismissed the argument. 60
V. CONCERNS WITH THE REMEDY UNDER RICO
The leaders aren't going to change. This is an effort to
intimidate the rank and file so they won't associate with us .




I am very much disturbed by some of the tactics of the persons
associated with the antiabortion movement. It's a very
sophisticated form of harassment, not something that the
average patrolman can say "I'm going to charge them with such
and such."'
1 62
(a Chief of Police)
In the Supreme Court's Scheidler II opinion, Justice Souter, joined
by Justice Kennedy, wrote a separate concurrence both to explain why
the First Amendment does not demand reading an economic motiva-
tion into RICO and also to stress the fact that the opinion does not bar
First Amendment challenges to RICO's use.
163
Justice Souter explained that, in construing a statute in a way
which addresses First Amendment concerns,' 6' the Court looks first
to a determination that the statute is ambiguous. Because RICO's
language is unambiguous, such an interpretation is unnecessary.
16
Furthermore, even if RICO were ambiguous, Justice Souter would not
159. If there is ambiguity in the language of a statute that provides for multiple
punishments, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity when sentencing. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990).
160. 114 S. Ct. at 506.
161. News Services, Abortion Clinics Can Use RICO Law to Sue Protesters, STAR TRIB., Jan.
25, 1994, at 1A (statement of Joseph Scheidler).
162. Boodman, supra note 28, at Al
163. 114 S. Ct. at 806.
164. Justice Souter cites Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961), where the Court held that antitrust laws do not apply to businesses
combining to lobby the government, even where such conduct has an anticompetitive purpose and
an anticompetitive effect, because the alternative "would raise important constitutional questions"
under the First Amendment.
165. 114 S. Ct. at 806-07.
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interpret the statute to include an economic motivation requirement.
He reasoned that such a requirement would be both over and
underinclusive. It would reach too widely in protecting entities whose
activities we would not wish to chill, and yet might sweep other fully
protected activity under RICO because of a failed economic motivation
test. 66 Lastly, Justice Souter cautioned the courts to look toward the
First Amendment both as a proper defense in a RICO suit and as a
command that relief be limited if a RICO violation has occurred but
the activity is protected under the First Amendment." 7 Through
this concurrence, the Court raised its concerns as to the propriety of
litigants using RICO as a tool to chill First Amendment speech.
The lower courts are perfectly able to address First Amendment
concerns, should they arise, in the application of RICO to antiabortion
groups. However, bombings, arson, the use of chemicals to damage
property, the pushing and shoving of pregnant women, death threats
to doctors and the like are not protected activities. No sane society
should fear the "chilling" of such conduct. The claim that First
Amendment protest activity is at risk in this scenario trivializes the
harm that is being inflicted against women, their doctors, and abortion
clinics every day. While violent protest activity may be a part of
American history, this argument does not address why we would want
to continue making it a part of American history.
Moreover, the statute itself contains several safeguards which
make it highly unlikely that RICO will be successfully applied to
peaceful protest activity protected by the First Amendment. These
safeguards also serve to highlight RICO's suitability for relief against
the leaders of the antiabortion movement and the unlikely possibility
of successful prosecution if RICO is applied to a generally peaceful
protester who performs a potentially criminal act in the heat of the
moment.
First, the most obvious hurdle a plaintiff must successfully jump
is the proving of the predicate acts. In cases involving violence against
abortion clinics, this has always consisted of Hobbs Act extortion. In
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,68 the court analyzed
whether the defendant's activities rose to the level of Hobbs Act
extortion. The court found that only non-peaceful activities, not
protected by the First Amendment, will rise to such a level as to form
166. Id. at 807.
167. Id.
168. 670 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1987). affd in part and rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
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the basis for a successful extortion claim.1 6 9 While First Amendment
analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment, it does appear obvious
that extortion and protected First Amendment activity are easily
separable. Although a conviction itself is not necessary to bring a
RICO civil suit, the activities that are necessary to find a defendant
liable under civil RICO are activities for which the defendant could be
criminally convicted.
1 71
RICO's second safeguard consists of section 1962(c)'s requirement
of a "pattern of racketeering activity." A defendant demonstrates a
"pattern of racketeering activity" when two predicate acts are commit-
ted within a ten-year period.' The Supreme Court has further
interpreted the pattern requirement as necessitating both (1) a
relationship between the predicate acts or an outside organizing
principle that renders the acts "ordered" or "arranged", and (2) a threat
of continued criminal activity.' 72 Additionally, the enterprise through
which this pattern of racketeering activity is conducted must have an
existence separate and apart from the predicate acts themselves.'73
A third safeguard is the requirement that these acts must have
been committed by an individual who has "participate[d], directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise."' 74 The Supreme Court
has interpreted this phrase to require that an individual have a part in
directing the enterprise's affairs; one must have participated in the
operation or management of the enterprise to be held liable.
17
These stringent requirements of section 1962(c) provide safeguards
for any real concern that RICO, applied to political organizations, will
chill protected protest activity or reach the generally peaceful protester
who may commit one potentially criminal act. Defendants may also
raise the First Amendment as a direct defense to a RICO civil suit.
If RICO is successfully applied to antiabortion groups and leaders of
the antiabortion movement who attempt to incite others to violence,
the statute may indeed have a chilling effect. However, the chilled
activities are precisely the types of activities for which this extraordi-
nary remedy was created-the systematic encouragement of the
commission of violent acts that interfere with interstate commerce.
These suits have not been, and will not be, successful against peaceful
169. Id. at 1308.
170. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(32) (1988).
172. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1989) (emphasis added).
173. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
175. Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1991).
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protesters. Perhaps RICO can help return the abortion debate to a
debate, and discourage the organizations and individuals responsible for
the creation of the abortion war.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
Then there are the noisy advocates of women's rights ... and,
of course, the advocates of the destruction of the most inno-
cent, most helpless humanity imaginable-unborn babies.
These advocates chant that they are pro-choice and the Senate








The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993 (FACE)
passed both a Senate and a House vote178 and was signed into law by
President Clinton on May 26, 1994.79 In efforts to "send an unmis-
takable message that violent conduct will not be tolerated,"' 80 Con-
gress, led by Senator Ted Kennedy, passed the bill to ensure access to
abortion clinics. FACE is designed to ensure such access, while
protecting the free speech rights of those who choose to peacefully
demonstrate in opposition to abortion.
In short, FACE amends the Public Health Service Act, subjecting
to both criminal penalties and a civil remedy persons who intentionally
(1) by force, threat of force, or physical obstruction injure, intimidate,
or interfere with or attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person because that person is or has been providing or obtaining
reproductive health services;8' or (2) damage or destroy the property
of a medical facility because such facility provides reproductive health
services. 182 Private civil remedies include compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive relief, and costs.' 3 Criminal penalties include
176. 139 CONG. REC. S15703, SI 5703 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Helms).
177. 139 CONG. REC. H10063, H10102 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Rep. Pat
Schroeder, referring to the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1993)).
178. S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
179. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.S. § 248 (Supp. 1994).
180. 139 CONG. REC. S11311 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
181. 18 U.S.C.S. § 248(3)(a)(1).
182. Id. § 248(3)(a)(1), (3).
183. Id. § 248(3)(c)(1)(B).
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prison terms and fines.' 84 In addition, the United States or State
Attorneys General may file civil actions.' It should be noted that
such actions may be filed when the Attorney General has reasonable
cause to believe that any person "is being, has been, or may be injured"
by a violation of the Act.'86
FACE does not interfere with the ability of the state or local law
enforcement authorities to prosecute.8 7  Furthermore, Congress has
expressly provided the assurance that the law shall not prohibit
expression protected by the First Amendment.'
Proponents of FACE urged that such legislation was necessary
because of the nationwide pattern of violence that has continued to
plague abortion clinics. 9  Federal criminal remedies are generally
imposed where important federal rights are at issue, where interstate
activity is involved, and where a need exists for uniform federal
sanctions and protections. 9°  These three characteristics are all
present in the problems posed by abortion clinic violence. The federal
right at issue is the right to choose an abortion. The interstate activity
involves the antiabortion groups themselves, which are interstate by
design. The need for federal intervention exists because of instances
where local law enforcement officers have either failed or refused to
implement the laws.' Violence directed at particular clinics ceased,
or at a minimum, lessened, when strict penalties were enforced.' 92
FACE was, and continues to be, vigorously attacked by opponents
both in Congress and within the antiabortion movement.'93 Oppo-
184. Id. § 248(3)(b)(2)(B).
185. Id. § 248(3)(c)(2)(A), § 2483(c)(3)(A).
186. Id. § 248(2)(A) (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 248(3)(d)(3).
188. Id. § 248(3)(d)(5).
189. See, H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993). In addition, Congress
determined that the Supreme Court's decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113
S. Ct. 753 (1993), eliminated injunctive relief as a remedy available at the federal level, thereby
necessitating legislation to provide such a remedy.
190. 137 CONG. REC. S4342, S4343 (daily ed., Mar. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Several suits have been brought, questioning the constitutionality of FACE; all but one
court has upheld the statute. United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis.), mandamus
denied sub nom., Hatch v. Stadtmueller, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32656 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 1994)
(suit brought under FACE against defendants for obstruction; FACE found to be content-neutral;
FACE is an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction; FACE is not overbroad or vague;
and FACE does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)); Riley v. Reno, 860
F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994) (FACE does not violate the First Amendment's right to freedom
of speech, freedom of the press or freedom of religion, the Due Process Clause's equal protection
rights, the Eighth Amendment's right to be free of excessive fines and cruel and unusual
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nent's arguments against FACE include: antiabortion demonstrators
are singled out for punishment in the absence of protection; the right
to abortion is the only right protected by the statute; the statute is
overbroad and/or vague; and, perhaps most importantly, criminal and
civil sanctions under the statute will chill important First Amendment
rights to free speech.'94
Congressional opponents of FACE argued that the statute is
unfair in that it singles out antiabortionists for punishment. They
argued that FACE should also protect antiabortionists from violence
directed against them by pro-choice proponents.195 However, while
there have been incidents of violence committed by pro-choice activists
against antiabortionists, such incidents are isolated and do not form
part of a national campaign. 96
Antiabortion legislators stated that FACE is a clear attempt to
punish an antiabortion viewpoint because the law does not encompass
violence arising out of other types of protest activity. In other words,
the only right protected by the statute is the right to abortion.'97  An
amendment to the statute extended the protection guaranteed to
reproductive health facilities to places of worship. 9 However, some
legislators would have liked to see similar attempts to curtail the
punishment, the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, or RFRA); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp.
1008 (W.D. La. 1994) (FACE does not violate the rights to freedom of speech, religion, or
assembly; due process of law, freedom from excessive punishment; equal protection of the law;
or interstate travel); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994)
(FACE upheld against the following challenges: freedom of expression and association,
establishment and free exercise clause, violation of the RFRA, and lack of Congressional authority
to pass under either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause); American Life League
v. United Sates, 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994) (FACE survived constitutional challenges
based on Congress' lack of authority, overbreadth, infringement of First Amendment speech,
vagueness, lack of viewpoint neutrality, and violation of the Free Exercise Clause) afftd, 47 F.3d
642 (4th Cir., 1994); Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding the statute on this
court's reasoning in American Life League against claims of vagueness, overbreadth and violation
of the First Amendment; ruling that the issue of whether FACE is unconstitutional because its
injunctive provisions authorize prior restraints on speech is not ripe for consideration because
there was no record of any actual or threatened injunction against this particular plaintiff); United
States v. Wilson, 1995 WL 114802 (E.D. Wis.) (holding FACE unconstitutional because it
exceeds the scope of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and because private action may
not be reached under the 14th Amendment).
194. See 139 CONG. REc. S15703, S1 5703-SI 5704 (daily ed. Nov 16, 1993) (statements of
Sen. Helms).
195. Id. In Washington state, charges were filed under FACE against a pro-choice advocate,
for threatening to kill staff at an antiabortion group. Davied Johnston Abortion Rights Advocate
is Accused of Threats, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1995, at A20.
196. Id. (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
197. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
198. 18 U.S.C.S. § 248(3)(a)(2).
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violent activity of labor union members, gay rights activists, animal
rights activists, anti-nuclear groups, and so on."' Again, however,
there has been no national campaign of violence from these groups.
Antiabortion groups are unique in their national, single-minded,
systematic attempts to threaten and harass. Indeed, one of the larger,
nationally-based antiabortion groups, Operation Rescue, has, in the
past, freely admitted that its purpose is simply "to prevent women
from having abortions."20
The arguments in Congress about the overbreadth and vagueness
of FACE centered on the terms "physical obstruction," "interfere,"
"intimidate," and "injury."201  The statute defines physical obstruc-
tion as "rendering impassable ingress to or egress from a medical
facility that provides abortion-related services, or rendering passage to
or from such a facility unreasonably difficult or hazardous"; interfer-
ence is "to restrict a person's freedom of movement"; intimidate means
"to place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him
or herself or to another."20 2 The argument that FACE is overbroad
or vague was based upon the assertion that sheer numbers of protesters
may block a facility and "intimidate," and that "interference" is too
subjective a term to adequately safeguard, for example, a protester who
is passing out literature on options to abortion. Furthermore,
opponents argued that the term "injury" was not defined, thereby
leaving open the possibility that the term encompasses pain and
suffering or emotional damages.0 3
Briefly stated, FACE is not overbroad or vague. In United States
v. Brock,2" the court ruled that FACE, to the extent it reaches
expressive activity, is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation;
the statute is therefore not overbroad. °0 The court also ruled that
FACE is not vague because a person of average intelligence would not
have to guess at its meaning, and because the statute gives fair notice
199. 139 CONG. REC. S15703 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Helms).
200. Women's Health Care Servs., P.A. v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 261 (1991),
rev'd and remanded, 24 F.3d 107, vacated, 25 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. May 11, 1994). Dr. George
Tiller, a plaintiff in this suit, was subsequently shot and wounded outside the abortion clinic at
which he worked. Phillips, supra note 30, at A8.
201. See 137 CONG. REC. S4342 (daily ed., Mar. 22, 1991); H.R. REP. NO. 306, supra note
189.
202. 18 U.S.C.S. § 248 3(e)(4), (2), (3).
203. H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 189, at 26.
204. United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis.), mandamus denied sub noam., Hatch
v. Stadtmueller, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32656 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 1994).
205. Id. at 865.
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to those it addresses. °6 The court noted that the same terms incor-
porated into FACE have survived a vagueness challenge in other
contexts .207
Speech, if protected by the First Amendment, does not lose its
protected status simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them
into action.20 Therefore, protesters legitimately exercising their right
to free speech need not fear that their conduct or speech will be
criminalized simply because the injury caused is emotional damage or
pain and suffering. The Supreme Court has also recognized that
abusive or inexact language, which is sometimes the language of the
political arena, is protected speech.2"9 An emotional injury would
obviously not be compensable if suffered at the hands of protected
speech. Emotional damages suffered at the hands of nonprotected
speech, however, may indeed be compensable.
The statute provides that "nothing ... shall be construed to
prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other
peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First
Amendment to the Constitution. ' 210  While the final determination
of the statute's constitutionality lies with the courts, this provision
appears to adequately safeguard the right to free speech under the First
Amendment.
VII. FACE-ING RICO: APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES
Hey... Boyd. Those babies didn't know when they were
dying by your butcher knife. So now you will die by my gun
in your head very very soon and you wont know when like the
babies don't. Get ready your [sic] dead."
(anonymous letter to a physician)
What's happening is that those who live by the sword now face
dying by the sword. Violence begets violence, and abortion is
the ultimate violence.12
(Joseph Scheidler)
206. Id. at 866 (citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972)).
207. Id. (citing Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968)).
208. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
209. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1966).
210. 18 U.S.C.S. § 248 (3)(d)(1).
211. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 23, at 10.
212. Balzar, supra note 21, at Al (statement of Joseph Scheidler).
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The remedy for the violence should reach both the individual
leaders of antiabortion groups and those organizations that advocate the
use of violence to achieve their goals. A complete remedy must also
reach the individual protester who takes the law into his own hands.
If FACE and RICO are each available to be applied to this extremist
conduct, an adequate remedy will be effected. In order for this to be
achieved, however, both statutes must be liberally utilized by both
private parties and prosecutors.
FACE is necessary to effect a total remedy for the violence and
obstructionist tactics directed toward abortion clinics. Congress'
enactment of FACE sends a strong message to the antiabortion
community that acts of obstruction and violence will no longer be
tolerated. It provides for desperately needed injunctive relief which
RICO does not provide. FACE also may be better suited to providing
a federal forum in instances where the violence is either sporadic or
committed by different individuals and thus may not rise to the level
of the pattern of extortionate activity required by RICO. The FACE
statute may help to discourage antiabortionists from specifically
targeting clinics in areas where local law enforcement has failed.
Furthermore, it appears that prosecutors are willing to charge
individuals with violations of FACE, whereas RICO remains unused
by the government in clinic violence actions.
Rather than singling out an entire protest movement with
legislation, RICO actions can be brought specifically against the
directors of the antiabortion groups who encourage illegal action.
Their presence or absence at the scene of the protest is immaterial.
The statute can also be used against the actual organizations that
support such violence through the use of newsletters and donations
received. Because of safeguards written into the statute, it is highly
unlikely, if not impossible, for a successful RICO suit to be brought
against an individual acting on his or her own initiative and engaging
in protected conduct. It is just as unlikely that a successful RICO
action could be brought against the individual protester who steps over
the picket line into violence as a first-time offender. RICO's safe-
guards make it an ideal weapon to aim at the directors and organizers
encouraging illegal acts.
Liability under RICO imposes severe penalties and serves to label
an individual or organization as a "racketeer." This serves two
purposes: It undermines the individual or organization financially and
it sends a strong message to the organization's supporters as to how
their methods of protest are being viewed in the culture. RICO is an
appropriate remedy for those injured by antiabortion violence. It is the
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best, indeed, the only remedy that encompasses those attempting to
incite others to violence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law of equality and the law of freedom of speech are on a
collision course in this country." 3
(Catherine MacKinnon)
The violence against and harassment of abortion clinics damages
not only the clinics, the clinic's patients, and women in general, but it
also damages the pro-life movement. Violence damages the movement
in that it becomes simple for the media, and therefore the average
American, to fail to distinguish between those seeking to incite others
to illegal acts and those engaged in violence from the person on the
sidewalk who peacefully protests in order to bring about social change.
Further polarization of the two sides of the abortion debate can lead
only to a cycle of further frustration and violence.
A remedy for the violence is necessary. RICO may be the
preferred remedy because of the statute's ability to single out both the
leaders spearheading and the antiabortion groups advocating violence
against clinics. FACE, however, is necessary to effect a total remedy
because it can be applied to individuals whose conduct involves illegal
obstruction or violence that does not rise to the level of extortion.
FACE also provides clinics with an injunctive remedy and promises
the hope for federal prosecutorial intervention. Any political question
so deeply rooted in spiritual and emotional beliefs will sometimes adopt
harsh, perhaps even abusive, arguments. However, the systematic
encouraging of illegal activity should not be confused with what this
country values as protected speech.
213. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (1993).
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